Indholdsfortegnelse for Issue 5 i War at Sea

THE Falkland Islands War at Sea

THE invasion of the Falklands in 1982 stunned the British public. At the time, Argentina faced huge domestic problems as the country struggled to overcome a failing economy and the military junta faced growing opposition. President Leonardo Galtieri and his cohorts sought to raise the country’s morale and most importantly ensure they remained in power. The UK government had failed to identify the political atmosphere in Buenos Aires which increasingly called for sovereignty of the Falklands, which they called Las Malvinas to be handed back to Argentina. Despite the shock of the assault into Port Stanley the British reacted within days. The robust reaction by Downing Street was not what Buenos Aires had expected. A Royal Navy Task Force was assembled within days complete with logistics, food, ammunition and water…

2 min

War at Sea|Issue 5

Operation Rosario

Galtieri now had to think about his next move. He would soon realise that winning the battle is just the opening action of any aggressive intervention. Winning the war ultimately defines success and a name in history. Argentina’s Navy was a mixture of modern and ageing warships, but nevertheless, they presented a significant capability. Likewise, the air force included some upgraded aircraft and weapons. Buenos Aires had ordered new Exocet missiles from France to be launched from Super Etendard fighters. But only a handful had arrived. As in any conflict, the ability to deliver success would be down to the determination and resilience of individual sailors, soldiers and airmen to overcome in adversity. More importantly, it would test the quality of their equipment and their Officers’ ability to motivate and…

15 min

War at Sea|Issue 5

The Political Conflict

A supermarket at Chertsey in Surrey summed up the public feeling with a sign in its window stating ‘we do not sell Argentina corn beef’. Within days of the assault at Port Stanley, a Royal Navy force of warships was assembled at Portsmouth and Plymouth ready to sail 8,000-miles to the South Atlantic. The assault on the Falklands was viewed by most people as a surprise action, but Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, and a small number of her ministers inside Downing Street had been aware of Argentina’s intent – but did not believe that the junta would take military action. The UK’s intelligence services had been monitoring the jingoistic claims in Buenos Aires, but failed to identify Argentina’s plans. Inside the Foreign Office, ministers reinforced the belief that the military…

21 min

War at Sea|Issue 5

Britain prepares for WAR

Ironically, just months earlier John Nott, the defence secretary, had listed these two carriers, along-with the amphibious assault ships HMS Fearless and HMS Intrepid, for withdrawal from the fleet as part of government cost-cutting plans drawn up in the 1981 review. In February 1982, the Australian government had agreed to buy HMS Invincible for £175 million. Now having escaped being sold or sent to the scrapyard, these warships were being prepared for war. The military, in particular the Navy, were quietly furious with Nott and his planned cuts, the fleet was now fighting for its future. On the day the Argentines invaded, the Admiral’s office had sent a warning order to the fleet raising their readiness for operations. Later in the day, after a subdued meeting in Downing Street, Admiral…

18 min

War at Sea|Issue 5

THE BATTLE FOR SAN CARLOS

Assault ships, landing vessels and warships were now about to move into San Carlos Water – well within range of the Mirage, Super Étendard and Skyhawk fighter aircraft. Commanders knew their warships were exposed to attack, but Admiral Sandy Woodward faced a difficult dilemma if he waited until the Harrier force had won the air battle, which could take several months, the South Atlantic winter would start to bite. Bad weather would impact the land force, limit the ability of helicopters to fly and delay the vital logistics chain. The mission was to retake the Falklands and Admiral Woodward opted to thrust forward with the assets at his disposal. Commodore Michael Clapp, the naval commander of the fleet’s amphibious operations, and Brigadier Thompson who commanded 3 Commando Brigade, had meticulously…

14 min

War at Sea|Issue 5

Galtieri’s Gamble

Lord Carrington’s Foreign Office department proposed to resolve the situation by issuing temporary visiting permissions to the workers. Argentine foreign minister Costa Méndez was vague in his response; he wanted the UK to agree to the process agreed in the Communications Treaty which had been adopted on the Falklands and had allowed Argentine planes to land on a weekly basis. But then London established that the scrap party had erected the Argentine flag at South Georgia and the political mood in London changed. Mrs Thatcher was furious at what was perceived as the junta’s aggressive attitude. London now ordered the visiting Argentines to leave and when it became clear their ship had sailed and left workers behind, Mrs Thatcher took action. In consultation with her military commanders, the Prime Minister…

18 min

War at Sea|Issue 5

BRITAIN strikes BACK

Washington had made it clear that while they supported the UK, they could not get involved in a conflict in the South Atlantic. There had been hope that the United States would provide airborne early warning planes, known as AWACS, but that was not going to happen. However, President Reagan’s administration did provide intelligence and on 9 April, the Pentagon passed information to the UK that revealed Argentina was lengthening the runway at Stanley in order to accommodate its fighter aircraft, such as A-4 Skyhawks, Mirage, Dagger and Super Étendards. This would give the junta the strategic advantage of being able to mount constant air strikes against the task force. The Argentine Air Force only had two tanker aircraft to serve the whole air force and navy. Its fighter bombers,…

21 min